



United States Mission to the OSCE

Significance of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and Regional Cooperation

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to the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation Workshop on Implementing
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in the OSCE
November 8, 2006

Madame Chairperson, Secretary General De Brichambaut, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen.

I am honored to help open this important workshop on UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

And I would like to start with three basic thoughts:

- First, terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction is one of the gravest threats today to the world community. The threat is real. The consequences would be enormous.
- Second, every government must act to keep WMD out of terrorist hands. That is precisely the point of Resolution 1540.
- Third, the OSCE can help implement 1540. It can do this by working with organizations like the IAEA and the OPCW to compile and promote best practice guidelines for the security and control of WMD material.

The Risks and Consequences of WMD Terrorism

Today, we are meeting in one of the world's most beautiful cities. Imagine this city, as the target of nuclear terrorism.

Here is an overhead photograph of Vienna showing the area of destruction that would be caused by an improvised nuclear device with an explosive yield of 10 kilotons.

The inner radius is a radius of about one kilometer from the blast -- that is much of Vienna inside the Ringstrasse. In this area, buildings would be immediately vaporized. Centuries-old landmarks would be destroyed. No one could be expected to survive. In the area one to two kilometers from the blast -- from the Liechtenstein Museum in the north to the Belvedere in the south -- most buildings would be reduced to rubble.

Thousands more people would die immediately or suffer severe radiation poisoning. Vienna's First District would be no more, and the surrounding districts would be in rubble. But that is not all. The financial, social, economic, and psychological destruction would reach across the globe.

Fundamental aspects of contemporary life -- including cross-border trade, international travel, financial markets, and open borders -- would come to a halt. Across the world, those who

live in prosperity would suffer. Those who already suffer in poverty would face a bleaker future.

Some may consider the probability of nuclear terrorism to be fairly low, whether in Vienna, Rome, Bratislava, Almaty, Moscow, Washington or any other OSCE city. But the consequences of nuclear terrorism, were it to ravage any major city, would be so grave and far reaching that it would be irresponsible not to do everything we possibly can, now, to avoid this horror.

We know that terrorists remain determined to kill innocent civilians and disrupt our societies on a large scale. We also know that there continues to be illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological material. We have to assume that terrorist groups will continue to try to acquire the sensitive material they need to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Now, Madame Chairperson, I don't know if this is appropriate or not, but I would like to ask for a show of hands.

How many people in this room are nuclear physicists or nuclear engineers?

OK, we've got one over there.

May I ask how many, like myself, studied a less exacting area, like Political Science or History?

[Many participants raise their hands.]

OK, well, Madame Chairperson, the good news is that probably no one in this room, with deference to my colleague from the IAEA, can build a nuclear weapon.

The bad news is that a dedicated group, with some knowledge of science and engineering, access to the internet and some funding, can construct such a device.

The basic technology for nuclear weapons is sixty years old.

The main hurdle in building nuclear weapons is to acquire the plutonium or the highly enriched uranium.

Where might terrorists get such material?

This map shows one possibility. The red area represents OSCE countries that use highly enriched uranium in civil applications such as research reactors. Most countries on this map are working to secure or remove this material. Often this involves repatriation of highly enriched uranium to countries of origin or converting reactors to use low-enriched uranium not suitable for nuclear bombs.

These efforts deserve our full support. Governments must secure this material before terrorists do.

Where there is demand and supply, there is also a market. The IAEA maintains a database of illicit trafficking in nuclear material. This database has recorded 18 confirmed incidents of trafficking in highly enriched uranium or plutonium in OSCE member states between 1993 and 2004. A few seizures involved kilogram quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material.

Only one small transaction, made anywhere in the world, to a dedicated terrorist group, could leave Vienna's beautiful First District in ruin.

This is why we must secure the supply and shut down the market.

Significance of UN Security Council Resolution 1540

We have made significant strides in elevating awareness about the need for strong controls to keep deadly technologies out of the wrong hands.

Yet, a clear gap persists between the global consensus on the threat of WMD proliferation, and national capacities and willingness to take decisive, concrete steps to prevent the threat.

Full implementation of resolution 1540 will help close this gap. 1540 establishes binding obligations on UN member states to prevent and deter illicit access to WMD and WMD-related materials.

States are obligated to take a range of preventative measures, including to:

- establish legal prohibitions;
- implement systems to account for, secure, and physically protect sensitive materials; and
- develop appropriate and effective border and trade controls.

The 1540 Committee has spent considerable time urging states to submit country reports detailing the steps that they have taken or intend to take to implement 1540.

All OSCE countries have submitted their reports, but others have not, and not all reports suggest that countries are dedicating the attention and resources necessary for full implementation of 1540.

We would like to make 2007 the year of implementation.

To do that, governments must establish clear national priorities, develop national implementation plans, and begin to act on them.

The United States recognizes that many governments might lack the necessary capacity or expertise to assess their abilities to implement 1540 and close any identified gaps. The United States stands ready to help with a variety of programs.

One of these, the State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security program, has budgeted almost \$132 million since 2004 for 1540-related training, equipment, legal, regulatory, and infrastructure development assistance.

There are other sources of help.

In Vienna, right across the Danube, the IAEA stands ready to dispatch assessment teams and to help governments meet established international standards for the physical protection of nuclear material. The 1540 Committee can help countries identify sources of assistance.

States committed to implementing 1540 can also help strengthen our collective defenses by participating in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. This initiative was announced in July by President Bush and President Putin and launched last month with ten Initial Partner Nations at a meeting in Rabat.

Countries that join the Global Initiative are committed to enhance cooperation and to build the capacity of all participant countries to combat the global threat of nuclear terrorism.

I might point out that the launching of this global initiative by President Putin and President Bush shows the very strong cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in this particular important area and the strong cooperation of our two countries in developing 1540 and implementing 1540.

Role of the OSCE

The OSCE also has a role to play in promoting regional implementation of 1540. The FSC should be applauded for focusing attention on the need for countries to prepare national implementation plans next year.

We also believe that the OSCE, working with organizations like the IAEA and OPCW, can compile and promote best practice guidelines for the security and control of WMD material.

Conclusion

Madame Chairperson, let me conclude where I began.

- First, the threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction is one of the gravest dangers we face in the 21st century. It is not just a threat to a few countries. It's a threat to every country both inside and outside the OSCE.
- Second, robust implementation of Resolution 1540 will diminish this threat. Terrorists will look for the weakest link, whether poorly secured materials, an unguarded border, or a judicial system not suited to the threat. Thus all states -- large and small, with sensitive materials and without -- must play their role.
- Third, the OSCE, working with organizations like the IAEA and OPCW, is in a strong position to promote best practices to help countries implement their 1540 obligations.

Finally, let me thank Ambassador Gibson for organizing this first Europe-wide workshop on 1540. The United States looks forward to continuing to cooperate with FSC partners in reducing a threat that is real, and with the gravest of consequences.

Thank you.